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What Political Legitimacy for a 
Reinforced EMU?
Identifying the 
Legitimacy Gap of EMU
Broad Economic Guidelines
MTO ≤ 1.0% of GDP
Annual Deficit ≤ 3% of GDP
Debt ≤ 60% of GDP
Legitimacy of EMU before the crisis
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Legitimacy of EMU before the crisis
 Incapacity of EMU to address the economic interdependence 
of national democracies created by economic globalisation 
and EU integration
– National democratic decision-making takes decisions that affect many 
living outside of the borders of that nation-state;
– National democratic decision-making cannot control many decision-
making processes taking place outside of the borders of the nation-
state that affect national polities but that;
– National democratic decision-making is committed to the national 
interest and does, hence, not take the interests of other EU Member 
States into account.
Legitimacy of EMU before the crisis
 Incapacity of EMU to balance conflicting demands of EU law
– Specialising on the comparative advantage (internal market) but
having resilient national economies in a situation of an asymmetric 
shock (affecting one economic sector) (monetary union)
– Procyclical budgetary policies (budget control) but establishing 
shock-absorbers financed by national budgets to be activated in 
crisis times (monetary union)
– Refinancing of public budgets on private financial markets (budget 
control) but no monetary policy instruments (monetary union) and 
not capital controls (internal market) in order to react to market 
failure and to the closure of market access
Legitimacy of EMU before the crisis
 Both incapacities have the potential of undermining national 
democratic decision-making
– because national democracies cannot deliver what they promise (self-
determined decision-making)
– because the voters‘ voice might be overruled by
• market reactions
• decisions of other national legislators
Legitimacy of EMU during and after the crisis
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Legitimacy of EMU during and after the crisis
 Crisis added to the legitimacy gap at the level of national 
democracies a legitimacy gap at the level of the EU
– Soft law policy goals (economic policy coordination) turned de facto 
into hard law policy goals because of the threat of sovereign default 
and the need of financial assistance
• democratic deficiencies in defining these policy goals turn into democratic 
defaults
• democratic deficiencies in supervising the enforcement of these policy goals 
turn into democratic defaults
– Pursuit of secondary objectives in monetary policy led to a 
politicisation of the ECB that conflicts with its independence
Legitimacy of EMU during and after the crisis
 ‘Faces’ of the additional legitimacy gap
– national democracies cannot deliver what they promise (self-
determined decision-making)
– voters‘ voice appears to be overruled by
• decisions of a ‘federalist executive’ (ECB, Commission, ESM [= Eurogroup]) that 
relies on a European interest (protecting the Euro)
• no parliamentary control of this ‘federalist executive’
• limited judicial control of this ‘federalist executive’
– national democratic externalities transform from undermining national 
economic policy preferences into reducing national budgetary 
capacities (by the way the ESM is financed)
Enhancing the 
Political Legitimacy of EMU
Enhancing the Political Legitimacy of EMU
 Creating capacities to address the interdependence of national 
democracies
 Creating capacities to balance the conflicting demands of EU law
– Allowing for larger national autonomy to address these demands?
– Reforming Structural Funds (to allow for sustainable market transformation)
– European Unemployment Benefits Scheme (to address asymmetric shocks)
– Fiscal Capacity (to allow for capacity-building in ME and to address symmetric shocks)
– Debt Mutualisation (to reduce market failure when refinancing government debt)
 Establishing Parliamentary control of the ‘federalist executive’
 Allowing for a fully-fledged judicial control of the ‘federalist 
executive’
Enhancing the Political Legitimacy of EMU
 Establishing Parliamentary control of the ‘federalist executive’
– Which Parliament(s) should control?
• Tentative reply: The Parliament that represents the interest an executive entitiy 
invokes and/or relies upon
• ‘Federalist Executive’ (in terms of EMU: ESM/EFSF/Troika) invokes a European 
interest (protecting the Euro as the currency of the EU): European Parliament
• ‘Federalist Executive’ relies upon national funds: National Parliaments
• Dual-hatted Parliamentary control
– It should be noted that Parliamentary control is not in itself closing the 
legitimacy gap
• Core question: Can the policy goals pursued by EMU be justified by reference to 
the beliefs of citizens?
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Democratic Scrutiny of the Eurogroup
 More transparency: Including the Eurogroup into Regulation (EC) 
No 1049/2001 on public access to documents
 More personal accountability: Merging the president of the 
Eurogroup and the president of the Board of Governors of the 
ESM with Commissioner for EMU
– President of the Eurogroup becomes personally accountable to the 
European Parliament as a member of the Commission
– Maybe: Modifying the IIA with the Commission in order to oblige the 
president of the Commission to make use of his/her right to request 
resignation of single commissioners if the president of the Eurogroup is 
concerned (exception to the principle of collective responsibility)
Quick Assessment of the 
Sinterklaas Package
Sinterklaas Package
 Transformation of the ESM into EMF
– Defintion of Policy Conditionality (Articles 12/13 of EMF-Statute): 
Synchronisation of MoU with Macroeconomic Adjustment Programme 
under the ‘Two Pack’ (= no approval by any Parliament)
– Compliance: Only information obligations vis-à-vis Parliaments; no 
instruments of accountability
– Transparency: Inclusion of EMF into Access to Documents regulation
– Yet: It will be a Union body
 Transformation of TSCG into EU law
 European Finance Minister
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